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Abstract
We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links
and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We dene the notion of
coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network
species the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members
and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are
going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which
requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both
the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always
exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision
rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover,
requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and e¢ ciency.
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1 Introduction
The organization of individual agents into networks and groups has an important role in
the determination of the outcome of many social and economic interactions. For instance,
networks of personal contacts are important in obtaining information about job oppor-
tunities. Goods can be traded and exchanged through networks, rather than markets,
of buyers and sellers. Networks also play important roles in providing mutual insurance
especially in developing countries.1 Partitioning of societies into groups is also important
in many contexts, such as the provision of public goods and formation of alliances, cartels
and federations. The understanding of how and why such networks and groups form and
the precise way in which they a¤ect outcomes of social and economic interactions has been
apprehended separately by the coalition theory and the network theory.
One limit of both theories is that it cannot incorporate the existence of bilateral agree-
ments among agents belonging to di¤erent coalitions that is commonly observed in many
situations. A rst situation has to do with the formation of R&D joint ventures and of
bilateral R&D collaborations. On the one hand, Bloch (1995) has analyzed the forma-
tion of associations of rms, like R&D joint ventures or groups of rms adopting common
standards, in an oligopolistic industry. On the other hand, Goyal and Moraga-González
(2001) or Goyal and Joshi (2003) have analyzed the incentives for R&D collaboration be-
tween horizontally related rms by considering that collaboration links are bilateral and
are embedded within a broader network of similar links with other rms. However, it may
happen that rms A and B may decide to form an R&D joint venture while rms B and
C sign a bilateral R&D agreement. What is the architecture of the resulting collaboration
network and the structure of associations that are likely to emerge?
A second situation has to do with the formation of free-trade agreements and customs
unions. On the one hand, Yi (1996) has studied the incentives for countries to form
regional free trade associations and customs unions, and the strategic stability of those
particular trading regimes. On the other hand, Goyal and Joshi (2005) and Furusawa
and Konishi (2006) have investigated the formation of bilateral free trade agreements as
a network formation game. Thus, the literature has considered that countries participate
either in the formation of bilateral free trade agreements or in the formation of customs
unions or multilateral free trade agreements, but not in the formation of both types of
agreements at the same time. This is a strong restriction indeed since many countries
are involved in both types of agreements at the same time: Mexico belongs to NAFTA
and has a bilateral free trade agreement with the European Community, while the United
States have no specic trade agreement with the European Community. What are the
1Jackson (2003, 2005) provides surveys of models of network formation.
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incentives for countries to form bilateral free trade agreements and/or customs unions?
There are many other situations where agents are part of a network and belong to
groups or coalitions. It is very common that rms having some common interest within
an industry regroup themselves into an industry association. Moreover, in various indus-
tries, such as automobiles, clothing, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and food, manufacturers
develop networks of exchange both with input suppliers and retailers or wholesalers.2 In
labour markets, workers are linked to each other within each rm through a hierarchy 
that is, a network and, at the same time workers may group themselves into unions.
Municipalities are connected to each other through a network of roads, railway tracks or
waterways, and they may share some common facilities or emergency services. Individuals
are living their social interactions in clubs or communities as well as through friendship
networks.
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study
which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We dene
the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where
the network species the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition
members and with individuals outside his coalition. This new framework forces us to
redene key notions of theory of networks, value and allocation rules, and to introduce a
new solution concept : contractual stability.
The idea of contractual stability is that adding or deleting a link needs the consent
of coalition partners. For instance, in the context of R&D alliances, rms may decide
to have a common laboratory with some partners, while developing bilateral R&D agree-
ments with other partners. The signing of a bilateral R&D agreement may need the
consent of those partners within the common laboratory or joint venture. Moreover, the
formation of new coalition structures may need the consent of original coalition partners.
Thus, once a coalition has been formed, the consent of coalitional partners is required in
order to add or delete links that a¤ect some coalition partners, or to modify the existing
coalition. As in Drèze and Greenberg (1980) the word "contractual" is used to reect the
notion that coalitions are contracts binding all members and subject to revision only with
consent of coalitional partners.3 Two di¤erent decision rules for consent are analyzed:
2Kranton and Minehart (2000) have analyzed the endogenous formation of networks between input
suppliers and manufacturers while Mauleon, Sempere and Vannetelbosch (2005) have studied the formation
of networks between manufacturers and retailers. Wang and Watts (2006) have examined the formation
of buyer-seller networks when sellers can form an association of sellers to pool their customers.
3One example mentioned by Drèze and Greenberg (1980) are rules governing entry and exit in labor
cooperatives. A new partner will enter the cooperative only if (i) he wishes to come in; (ii) his new partners
wish to accept him; and (iii) he obtains from his former partners permission to withdraw (only if he was
before member of another cooperative).
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simple majority or unanimity.4 When allocations do not depend on coalition structures,
there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the unanimity decision
rule. Looking at some classical models from network theory (co-author model, symmetric
connections model, model of buyer-seller networks), we observe that requiring the consent
of group members under the simple majority may help to reconcile stability and e¢ ciency.
When allocations depend on coalition structures, there always exists a contractually sta-
ble coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise
egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. However, if the component-wise dictatorial
allocation rule is adopted, then a contractually stable coalitional network always exists
only under the unanimity decision rule.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the framework of coali-
tional networks. In Section 3 we dene the concept of contractual stability. In Section 4
we derive some results about the existence of contractually stable networks and we look
whether e¢ cient coalitional networks are likely to be stable or not. In Section 5 we com-
ment upon some of the features of the framework showing that it is general enough to
study the emergence of community structures. In addition, it can be extended so that
overlapping collections of individuals may arise. In Section 6 we conclude.
2 Coalitional networks
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the nite set of players who are connected in some network rela-
tionship and who belong to some coalitions or communities. A coalitional network (g; P )
consists of a network g 2 GN and a coalition structure P 2 P. A network g is simply a
list of which pairs of players are linked to each other with ij 2 g indicating that i and
j are linked under the network g. Let GN = fg : g  gNg denote the set of all possi-
ble networks on N and gN is the set of all subsets of N of size 2. A coalition structure
P = fS1; S2; :::; Smg is simply a partition of the player set N , Sa \ Sb = ? for a 6= b,
[ma=1Sa = N and Sa 6= ? for a = 1; :::;m. Let #Sa be the cardinality of coalition Sa and
S(i) 2 P be the coalition whose player i belongs. Let P denote the nite set of coalition
structures. A sub-coalitional network of (g; P ) is (h;Q) with h  g and Q  P . For
instance, if N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8g, then (g; P ) = (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g, ff1g; f2; 3; 4; 5g,
f6; 7; 8gg) is the coalitional network in which there is a link between players 1 and 2, a
link between players 2 and 3, a link between players 4 and 5, a link between players 5 and
6, and a link between players 7 and 8, and players 2, 3, 4 and 5 are in the same coalition
while players 6, 7 and 8 are in another coalition and player 1 is alone. This coalitional
4For instance, the unanimity decision rule is used in the European Community whenever a new bilateral
free trade agreement is proposed by any country member.
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network (g; P ) = (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g; ff1g; f2; 3; 4; 5g; f6; 7; 8gg) is depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: A coalitional network
Let N(g) = fi j 9j such that ij 2 gg be the set of players who have at least one link in
the network g. Let n(g) be the cardinality of N(g). For any Q  P , N(Q) = fi 2 S : S 2
Qg is the set of players that belong to some coalition S 2 Q. Let N(g+Q) = N(g)[N(Q).
Finally, let N(g; P ) be the set of players who have at least one link in the network g or
that belong to a coalition S 2 P such that at least one member of S has a link in the
network g.
Denition 1 A component of a coalitional network (g; P ) is a nonempty sub-coalitional
network (h;Q), with h  g and Q = fSk : Sk 2 Pg  P , such that
(i) h = fij 2 g : 9S; S0 2 Q such that i 2 S and j 2 S0g;
(ii) for all S; S0 2 Q there exists a sequence of coalitions S1; S2; :::; SK with S1 = S and
SK = S0such that for any l 2 f1; :::;K   1g, Sl 2 Q and there exists ilil+1 2 h with
il 2 Sl and il+1 2 Sl+1.
A component (h;Q) of (g; P ) consists of a nonempty sub-network h of g and the
coalitions in P that contain at least one player with a link in h. The set of components
of (g; P ) is denoted as C(g; P ). Under this denition of a component, a coalition whose
members have no links is not considered as a component.
Denition 2 A sub-coalitional network (h;Q) is connected if for each i 2 N(h+Q) and
j 2 N(h + Q) there exists a sequence of coalitions S1; S2; :::; SK with i 2 S1 2 Q and
j 2 SK 2 Q such that for any l 2 f1; :::;K   1g, Sl 2 Q and there exists ilil+1 2 h with
il 2 Sl and il+1 2 Sl+1.
Consider the coalitional network (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g; ff1g; f2; 3g; f4; 5g; f6; 7; 8gg). The
connected sub-coalitional networks are (f12; 23g, ff1g; f2; 3gg), (f23g, ff2; 3gg), (f12g,
4
ff1g, f2; 3gg), (f45; 56; 78g, ff4; 5g, f6; 7; 8gg), (f45g, ff4; 5gg), (f56g, ff4; 5g, f6; 7; 8gg),
(f78g, ff6; 7; 8gg). The components are the maximal connected sub-coalitional networks,
that is (f12; 23g; ff1g; f2; 3gg) and (f45; 56; 78g; ff4; 5g; f6; 7; 8gg). These two components
are depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: A coalitional network and its components
Let (g; P ) denote the partition of N induced by (g; P ). That is, S 2 (g; P ) if
and only if (i) there exists (h;Q) 2 C(g; P ) such that S = N(h;Q), or (ii) S 2 P such
that for all i 2 S, i =2 N(g; P ). (f12; 23; 45; 56; 78g; ff1g; f2; 3g; f4; 5g; f6; 7; 8gg) =
ff1; 2; 3g; f4; 5; 6; 7gg in the previous example.
Di¤erent coalitional networks lead to di¤erent values of overall production or overall
utility to players. These various possible valuations are represented via a partition value
function. A partition value function is a function v : GN  P ! R. Let V be the set
of all possible partition value functions. A partition value function only keeps track of
how the total societal value varies across di¤erent coalitional networks. The calculation
of partition value is a richer object than a partition function in a partition game and/or a
value function in a network game, as it allows the value generated to depend both on the
coalition structure and on the network structure. A partition value function v is component
additive if X
(h;Q)2C(g;P )
v(h;Q) = v(g; P ).
Component additivity is a condition that rules out externalities across components but
still allows them within components. A coalitional network (g; P ) is e¢ cient relative to a
partition value function v if v(g; P )  v(g0; P 0) for all g0 2 GN and all P 0 2 P.
We also wish to keep track of how that value is allocated or distributed among the
players in any coalitional networks. An allocation rule is a function Y : GN PV ! RN
such that X
i2N
Yi(g; P; v) = v(g; P ) for all v, g and P .
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It is important to note that an allocation rule depends on g, P and v. This allows
an allocation rule to take full account of a player is role in the network and in the
coalition structure. This includes not only what the network conguration and coalition
structure are, but also and how the value generated depends on the overall network and
coalition structure. A coalitional network (g; P ) is Pareto e¢ cient relative to partition
value function v and allocation rule Y if no g0 2 GN and no P 0 2 P exist such that
Yi(g
0; P 0; v)  Yi(g; P; v) for all i with strict inequality for some i.
We propose next three allocation rules that will be helpful for obtaining existence of
stable coalitional networks. For any component additive partition value function v 2 V,
the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce is such that for any (h;Q) 2 C(g; P )
and each i 2 N(h;Q),
Y cei (g; P; v) =
v(h;Q)
#N(h;Q)
.
For any partition value function v 2 V that is not component additive, Y ce(g; P; v) splits
the value v(g; P ) equally among all players. The component-wise egalitarian rule is one in
which the value of each component is split equally among the members of the component
provided the partition value function is component additive.
Let iS be the player i 2 S, S  N , such that i  j for all j 2 S. For any component
additive partition value function v 2 V, the component-wise dictatorial allocation rule Y cd
is such that for any (h;Q) 2 C(g; P ) and each S 2 Q,
Y cdi (g; P; v) =
(
v(h;Q)
#Q i = i
S ,
0 8i 2 S, i 6= iS
For any partition value function v 2 V that is not component additive, Y cd(g; P; v) splits
the value v(g; P ) equally among all players. The component-wise dictatorial rule is one in
which the value of each component is split equally among one member of each coalition
belonging to the component provided this can be done.
For any component additive partition value function v 2 V, the component-wise ma-
joritarian allocation rule Y cm is such that for any (h;Q) 2 C(g; P ),
Y cmi (g; P; v) =
8><>:
v(h;Q)P
S2Q
[#S2 +mod[#S;2]]
8i 2 S0  S
0 8i 2 S00  S
with S0 \ S00 = ?, S0 [ S00 = S, #S0  #S00  #S2  mod[#S; 2], and iS
00
> j 8j 2 S0. For
any partition value function v 2 V that is not component additive, Y cm(g; P; v) splits the
value v(g; P ) equally among all players. The component-wise majoritarian rule is one in
which the value of each component is split equally among half members of each coalition
belonging to the component provided this can be done.
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3 Contractual stability
A simple way to analyze the coalitional networks that one might expect to emerge in the
long run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that no coalition benets from
altering the coalitional network. What about possible deviations ? A coalitional network
(g0; P 0) is obtainable from (g; P ) via S, S  N , if
(i) ij 2 g0 and ij =2 g implies fi; jg  S, and
(ii) ij =2 g0 and ij 2 g implies fi; jg \ S 6= ?, and
(iii) fSa n (Sa \ S) : Sa 2 Pg = fS0a 2 P 0 : S0a  N n Sg, and
(iv) 9fS01; S02; :::; S0mg  P 0 such that [ma=1S0a = S.
Condition (i) asks that any new links that are added can only be between players
inside S. Condition (ii) requires that there must be at least one player belonging to S
for the deletion of a link.5 Condition (iii) embodies the assumption that no simultaneous
deviations are possible. So if players in S deviate leaving their coalition in P , non-deviating
players do not move. Condition (iv) allows deviating players in S to form one or several
coalitions in the new coalitional structure P 0. Non-deviating players do not belong to
those new coalitions.
Denition 3 A coalitional network (g; P ) is contractually stable under the unanimity
decision rule with respect to partition value function v and allocation rule Y if for any
S  N , (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P ) via S and i 2 S such that Yi(g0; P 0; v) > Yi(g; P; v),
there exists k 2 S(j) with S(j) 2 P and j 2 S such that Yk(g0; P 0; v)  Yk(g; P; v).
Under the unanimity decision rule, the move from a coalitional network (g; P ) to any
obtainable coalitional network (g0; P 0) needs the consent of every deviating player as well
as the consent of every member of the initial coalitions of the deviating players. Then,
a coalitional network is contractually stable6 if any deviating player or any member of
5These rst two conditions have been introduced rst by Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) to
dene the netwoks obtainable from a given network by a coalition S.
6This denition of contractual stability would revert to Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) denition of
strong stability if players were not able to form coalitions. The denition of strong stability of Dutta and
Mutuswami considers a deviation to be valid only if all members of a deviating coalition are strictly better
o¤, while the denition of Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) is slightly stronger by allowing for a
deviation to be valid if some members are strictly better o¤ and others are weakly better o¤.
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the former coalitions of the deviating players is not better o¤ from the deviation to any
obtainable coalitional network (g0; P 0).7
Denition 4 A coalitional network (g; P ) is contractually stable under the simple major-
ity decision rule with respect to partition value function v and allocation rule Y if for any
S  N , (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P ) via S and i 2 S such that Yi(g0; P 0; v) > Yi(g; P; v),
there exists
(i) l 2 S such that Yl(g0; P 0; v)  Yl(g; P; v), or
(ii) bS  S(j) with S(j) 2 P and j 2 S such that Yk(g0; P 0; v)  Yk(g; P; v) for all k 2 bS
and #bS  12#S(j).
Under the simple majority decision rule, the move from a coalitional network (g; P )
to any obtainable coalitional network (g0; P 0) needs the consent of every deviating player
as well as the consent of more than half members of each initial coalition of the deviating
players. Then, a coalitional network is contractually stable if any deviating player or
half members of each former coalition of the deviating players are not better o¤ from the
deviation to any obtainable coalitional network (g0; P 0). Obviously, a coalitional network
that is contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule is contractually stable
under the unanimity decision rule. In fact each decision rule requires the consent of
coalitional partners above some quota for a deviation not to be blocked. For instance,
the simple majority decision rule reverts to a quota q = 12#S + mod[#S; 2] while the
unanimity decision rule reverts to a quota q = #S.8
To illustrate both the framework of coalitional networks and the concept of contrac-
tual stability we consider an alternative version of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) symmetric
connections model where players form links with each other in order to exchange informa-
tion.
Example 1. The connections model with communication costs shared within groups.
Players form links with each other in order to exchange information and form coalitions
in order to share communication costs. If player i is "connected" to player j, by a path of
t links, then player i receives a payo¤ of t from his indirect connection with player j. It
7Players cannot be farsighted in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their ac-
tions. Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) have proposed a general concept, social rationalizability,
that predicts which structures of cooperation are going to emerge among farsighted players.
8The relationship between contractual stability under any decision rule embodied by a quota is obvious:
a quota q0 < q renes stability. That is, the set of contractually stable coalitional networks under q0 is
(weakly) included in the set of contractually stable coalitional networks under q. Indeed, the probability to
block a deviation is greater the higher the quota q. When the quota approaches zero (q ! 0), coalitional
membership has no matter in terms of consent.
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is assumed that 0 <  < 1, and so the payo¤ t decreases as the path connecting players i
and j increases; thus information that travels a long distance becomes diluted and is less
valuable than information obtained from a closer neighbor. Each direct link ij results in a
cost c to both i and j. This cost can be interpreted as the time a player must spend with
another player in order to maintain a direct link. The communication costs are shared
equally within groups. Player is payo¤ from a network g in a coalition S(i) is given by
Yi(g; P ) =
X
j 6=i
t(ij)   1
#S(i)
X
j2S(i)
0@ X
k:jk2g
c
1A ,
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij) =1
if there is no path between i and j). Inside each group, the consent of members is needed
in order to modify the network and/or the coalition structure. The contractually stable
coalitional networks in case of three players under the simple majority decision rule are
depicted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Stable coalitional networks in the connections model with costs shared within groups
The contractually stable coalitional networks in case of three players under the sim-
ple majority decision rule are: (?; ff1g; f2g; f3gg) if and only if c > maxf34( + 2); g,
(f12; 13; 23g; ff1g; f2g; f3gg) if and only if c <    2, (?; ff1; 2; 3gg) if and only if
c > 32, (f12; 13; 23g; ff1; 2; 3gg) if and only if c < minf   2; 34g, (?; ffi; jg; fkgg)
if and only if c > maxf34(+ 2); g, (fij; ikg; ffig; fjg; fkgg) if and only if   2 < c < ,
(fij; ikg; ffig; fj; kgg) if and only if    2 < c < , (fij; ikg; ffi; jg; fkgg) if and only if
c < minf + 2; 43g, and (fij; ik; kjg; ffi; jg; fkgg) if and only if c <    2. While the
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allocation rule depends on coalitions, the partition value function does not depend on coali-
tions. Hence, the e¢ cient coalitional networks are like the e¢ cient networks of the original
symmetric connections model where each player only bears his own costs. Precisely, the
e¢ cient coalitional networks are (fij; ik; kjg; ffig; fjg; fkgg), (fij; ik; kjg; ffi; jg; fkgg),
(fij; ik; kjg; ffi; j; kgg) if c <    2, (fij; ikg; ffig; fjg; fkgg), (fij; ikg; ffi; jg; fkgg),
(fij; ikg; ffig; fj; kgg), (fij; ikg; ffi; j; kgg) if  2 < c < + 122, and (?; ffig; fjg; fkgg),
(?; ffi; jg; fkgg), (?; ffi; j; kgg) if  + 122 < c. We have that, for any parameter values,
there is always an e¢ cient coalitional network which is contractually stable under the
simple majority decision rule.
There are many contractually stable networks in the connections model when com-
munication costs are shared within groups. However, it is easy to nd an example
where a contractually stable network fails to exist. For instance, take N = f1; 2; 3g
and let P = ff1g; f2g; f3gg. Payo¤s are given by Yi(?; P ) = 1, Y1(f23g; P ) = 1,
Y2(f23g; P ) = 2, Y3(f23g; P ) = 4, Y1(f13g; P ) = 4, Y2(f13g; P ) = 1, Y3(f13g; P ) = 2,
Y1(f12g; P ) = 2, Y2(f12g; P ) = 4, Y3(f12g; P ) = 1, Yi(f13; 23g; P ) = 3, Yi(f12; 13g; P ) =
3, Yi(f12; 23g; P ) = 3, Yi(f12; 13; 23g; P ) = 1, and Yi(g; P ) = 0 8i 2 N , 8P 6= P , 8g 2 GN .
The coalitional networks with positive payo¤s are depicted in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Non-existence of contractually stable networks
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4 Stability and e¢ ciency
4.1 Allocations do not depend on coalition structures
While contractually stable networks may fail to exist in general, we now examine the
existence of contractually stable coalitional networks when values and/or allocations do
not depend on coalition structures.
Proposition 1 Suppose that v(g; P ) = v(g) 8P 2 P. Under the unanimity decision rule,
there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network.
Proof. Take the e¢ cient network g. Then, (g; fNg) is contractually stable. In-
deed, for all (g0; P ) obtainable from (g; fNg) via S there is a player i 2 N such that
Yi(g
0; P; v) < Yi(g; fNg; v).9
What about the existence of contractually stable coalitional networks under the simple
majority decision rule? Let D(g; P ) be the set of coalitional networks that are obtainable
from (g; P ) via protable deviations that do not modify P . That is, given (g; P ), (g0; P ) 2
D(g; P ) if (i) 9S  N such that (g0; P ) is obtainable from (g; P ) via S and (ii) Yi(g0; P; v) >
Yi(g; P; v) 8i 2 S. A coalitional network (g; P ) is critical if there exists a coalition T
that can block any protable deviation obtainable from (g; P ) that do not modify P .
That is, a coalitional network (g; P ) is critical with respect to partition value function
v and allocation rule Y if 9T  N such that (i) #T  minf#D(g; P ); N=2g and (ii)
Yi(g
0; P; v)  Yi(g; P; v) 8i 2 T , 8g0 2 GN such that (g0; P ) 2 D(g; P ).
Proposition 2 Suppose that Y (g; P; v) = Y (g; v) 8P 2 P. If (g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg) is
critical with respect to partition value function v and allocation rule Y , then 9P 2 P such
that (g; P ) is contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule.
Proof. Since the coalitional network (g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg) is critical, there exists T  N
with #T  minf#D(g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg); N=2g and such that all its members do not
prefer the allocation they could obtain in any coalitional network (g0; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg)
obtainable from (g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg) via S, S \ T = ? with (g0; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg) 2
D((g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg)). Two cases have to be considered.
First, assume that minf#D(g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg); N=2g = #D(g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg).
Then, there always exists a coalitional network (g; P ) that is contractually stable under
9 In addition take any network g where some player i receives the maximum he can get for all g0 2 GN .
Then, (g; fNg) is contractually stable since all moves to any (g0; P ) obtainable from (g; fNg) via S is
blocked by player i.
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the simple majority rule. We simply need to match a member of each coalition S of devia-
tors to coalitional networks (g0; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg) 2 D((g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg)) with some
member of coalition T . Second, assume that minf#D(g; ff1g; f2g; :::; fngg); N=2g = N=2
which implies that #T  N=2. Then, the coalitional network (g; fNg) is contractually
stable under the simple majority rule since the members of coalition T will block any
possible deviation from (g; fNg).
To illustrate this result we reconsider Jackson and Watts exchange networks model
where four players get value from trading goods with each other.
Example 2. Trading networks (Jackson and Watts, 2002). Players have the same utility
function, u(x; y) = x  y. Players have a random endowment which is independently and
identically distributed: (1; 0) with probability 12 and (0; 1) with probability
1
2 . Players
can trade with any of the other players that they are directly or indirectly linked to. For
instance, if g = f12; 34g then players 1 and 2 can trade with each other; players 3 and 4
can trade with each other; but there is no trade between 12 and 34. Trade ows without
friction along any "network path", and each "network component" trades to a Walrasian
equilibrium. Thus, f12; 23g and f12; 23; 13g lead to the same expected trades, but lead
to di¤erent costs of links. What are the payo¤s? Let c = 5=96 be the cost of maintaining
a link. Ignoring the costs of links, the expected utility of an individual is increasing and
strictly concave in the number of other individuals that he is directly or indirectly linked
to: (i) the utility of being alone is 0; (ii) the expected utility for a player of being directly or
indirectly linked to one player is 1=8; (iii) the expected utility for a player of being directly
or indirectly linked to two players is 1=6; (iv) the expected utility for a player of being
directly or indirectly linked to three players is 3=16. There are no pairwise nor strongly
stable network in Jackson and Watts exchange networks model with four players. Suppose
now that players can also form trade associations. Inside each trade association, the con-
sent of association members is needed in order to modify the exchange network and/or the
coalition structure. Under the unanimity decision rule, (f12; 23; 34g; fNg) is contractually
stable. Under the simple majority decision rule, (f12; 23; 34g; ff1; 2g; f3; 4gg) is contractu-
ally stable. Notice that (f12; 23; 34g; ff1g; f2g; f3g; f4gg) is critical. Indeed, the coalitions
f1; 2g and f3; 4g will block all protable deviations from the network f12; 23; 34g as shown
in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: A critical coalitional network in the exchange network model
(all payo¤s are in 96-ths)
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It is well-known that the relationship between stability and e¢ ciency of networks is
context dependent. Contractual stability requires the consent of group members in or-
der to modify the network and/or the coalition structure. Does it reconcile individual or
group incentives to form links and e¢ ciency? Let us look at some classical examples to
see whether requiring the consent of group members under the simple majority may help
or not to reconcile stability and e¢ ciency.
Example 3. The co-author model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Each player is a re-
searcher who spends time writing papers and each player may belong to a research lab. If
two players are linked, then they are working on a paper together. The amount of time
researcher i spends on a given project is inversely related to the number of projects ni
that he is involved in. Formally, player is payo¤ is given by
Yi(g) =
X
j:ij2g

1
ni
+
1
nj
+
1
ninj

= Yi(g; P ) 8P 2 P, ni > 0.
Inside each lab, the consent of lab members is needed in order to modify the network
and/or the coalition structure. The possible coalitional networks and their associated
payo¤s in the co-author model with three players are depicted in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Contractually stable coalitional networks in the co-author model with three players
In the original co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), there does not exist
strongly stable networks among three players. However, once authors may need con-
sent of coalitional (or lab) partners, many forms of collaborations among authors become
stable. Indeed, the coalitional network (g; ff1g; f2g; f3gg) is not contractually stable; but
the coalitional networks (f12g; ff1; 2g; f3gg) and (f12; 23g; ff1; 2g; f3gg) are contractually
stable under the simple majority rule. For instance, (f12; 23g; ff1; 2g; f3gg) is contractu-
ally stable because players 1 and 3 would like to add the link 13 but this addition will be
blocked by player 2 since player 1 needs the consent of player 2 (player 2 belongs to the
same coalition as player 1 while player 3 is alone). Moreover, (f12; 23g; ff1; 2g; f3gg) is
an e¢ cient coalitional network.
Proposition 3 Take the co-author model. For n even, (g; P ) is contractually stable under
the simple majority rule and e¢ cient if g is a network consisting of n2 separate pairs and
P is a coalition structure consisting of n2 coalitions such that j 2 S(i) if and only if ij 2 g.
Proof. For n even, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, p.57) have shown that a network g
consisting of n2 separate pairs is e¢ cient. Since v(g; P ) = v(g) for all P 2 P, we have that
(g; P ) is e¢ cient for all P 2 P. Thus, for any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P ) via deviations
of S we have that at least one player j, with S\S(j) 6= ?, is worse o¤ at (g0; P 0) compared
to (g; P ). We show now that any of such deviations will be blocked. Two cases have to
be considered. First, if S \ S(j) 6= ? and j 2 S then j will block the deviation since this
deviation is making j worse o¤. Second, if S \ S(j) 6= ? and j =2 S then j will block
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the deviation since js agreement is needed given that js partner in S(j) belongs to the
deviating coalition S.
Example 4. The symmetric connections model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Each
player forms links with other players in order to exchange information and each player
bears his own costs of maintaining direct links. Player is payo¤ from a network g is given
by
Yi(g) =
X
j 6=i
t(ij)  
X
j:ij2g
c = Yi(g; P ) 8P 2 P,
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij) =1
if there is no path between i and j),  2 (0; 1) and c is the cost of maintaining a direct link.
Jackson and Wolinsky have shown that for intermediate costs a conict between stability
and e¢ ciency will arise. For  < c <  + ((N   2)=2)2, a star network encompassing
all players is the unique e¢ cient network but is not pairwise (nor strongly) stable. A
star network is simply a network in which all players are linked to one central player and
there are no other links. However, once we allow players to belong to coalitions and that
deviations need the consent of more than half of the members of the initial coalitions of
the deviating players, then the conict between stability and e¢ ciency may be resolved.
Proposition 4 Take the symmetric connections model. For  < c <  + ((N   2)=2)2,
(g; P ) is contractually stable under the simple majority rule and e¢ cient if g is a star
network encompassing all players and #S(i)  2, S(i) 2 P with i being the center of
the star network.
Proof. For  < c <  + ((N   2)=2)2, Jackson and Wolinsky have shown that a star
network encompassing all players is e¢ cient. Since c > , a star network encompassing all
players where i is the center of the star network gives to each player i 6= i his highest
possible payo¤ he can obtain in any g 2 GN . The only player who has incentives to modify
the star network encompassing all players is i who obtains a negative payo¤ when c > .
Thus, if player i is in a coalition S(i) with other players (that is, #S(i)  2), those
players will block any deviation from the star network encompassing all players.
Example 5. A model of buyer-seller networks (Kranton and Minehart, 2001). There is
one seller who has an indivisible object for sale and n potential buyers who have utilities
for the object, denoted ui, which are uniformly and independently distributed on [0; 1].
The object to sell has no value to the seller. Each buyer knows his own valuation, but only
the distribution over the buyersvaluations. The seller also knows only the distribution of
buyersvaluations. The object is sold by means of a standard second-price auction. Only
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the buyers who are linked to the seller participate to the auction. Let k be the number of
buyers linked to the seller. For a cost per link of cs to the seller and cb to the buyer, the
allocation rule for any network g with k  1 links between the buyers and the seller is
Yi(g) =
8>><>>:
1
k(k+1)   cb if i is a linked buyer
k 1
k+1   kcs if i is the seller
0 if i is a buyer without any links.
= Yi(g; P ) 8P 2 P,
The value function is
v(g) =
k
k + 1
  k (cs + cb) = v(g; P ) 8P 2 P,
which is simply the expected value of the object to the highest valued buyer less the cost
of links. Let k be the number of links that maximizes kk+1   k (cs + cb).
Proposition 5 Take the buyer-seller network model. (g; P ) is contractually stable under
the simple majority rule and e¢ cient if g is a network with k links and if P is a coalition
structure such that S(i) 2 P with i being the seller and buyer j 2 S(i) if and only if
ij 2 g.
Proof. The e¢ cient network is one with k links where
k =
(
k such that (k (k + 1)) 1  cs + cb  ((k + 1) (k + 2)) 1 if k  n
n otherwise
:
Take k 6= 0. Since (k (k + 1)) 1   cb  ((k + 1) (k + 2)) 1   cb, the buyers al-
ready linked to the seller will block the addition of new links to the e¢ cient network.
Moreover, the buyers linked to the seller have no incentives to cut their links. Since
(k   1) (k + 1) 1 kcs  (k   2) (k) 1  (k   1) cs which reverts 2 (k (k + 1)) 1 
cs, the seller does not want to cut links to the e¢ cient network. Take now k = 0. Since
the empty network is the e¢ cient one, if the seller wants to link to a buyer, then this
buyer does not want, or vice versa.
In the original model of buyer seller networks, a conict between stability and e¢ ciency
is likely to occur when cs > 0. However, once the seller may need the consent of the buyers
linked to him, the e¢ cient network becomes stable. While the seller and the buyers with
no link have incentives to add links, the decision for adding new links will be turned down
by the buyers who are already linked to the seller.
Thus, we observe that contractual stability may help to stabilize the e¢ cient networks
in some classical examples. However, contractual stability may also stabilize ine¢ cient
networks that were not stable before requiring the consent of group members.
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4.2 Allocations depend on coalition structures
We now study the existence of contractually stable coalitional networks when values and
allocation rules depend on coalition structures. Let gS be the set of all subsets of S  N
of size 2. Let
(h;Q)[S] = argmax
hgS ;QP
s.t. (h;Q) is connected
v(h;Q)
#N(h;Q)
be the connected sub-coalitional network with the highest per capita value out of those
that can be formed by players in S  N . Given a component additive partition value
function v, nd a coalitional network (g; P )v;ce through the following algorithm. Pick
some (g1; Q1) 2 (h;Q)[N ]. Next, pick some (g2; Q2) 2 (h;Q)[N n N(g1; Q1)]. At stage k
pick some (gk; Qk) 2 (h;Q)[N n[ik 1N(gi; Qi)]. Since N is nite this process stops after
a nite number K of stages. The union of the components picked in this way denes a
coalitional network (g; P )v;ce which is Pareto e¢ cient.10
Proposition 6 Under a component additive partition value function v, a coalitional net-
work (g; P )v;ce dened by the preceding algorithm is contractually stable under the simple
majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce.
Proof. Given the algorithm and the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce, the
players in N(g1; Q1) obtain the highest possible payo¤ they can get. So, no player in
N(g1; Q1) will deviate from (g; P )v;ce. Players in any N(gk; Qk), k = 2; :::;K, obtain the
highest possible payo¤ they can get among the players in N n [ik 1N(gi; Qi). However,
their payo¤ is smaller than the payo¤ of players in N(gj ; Qj) with j = 1; :::; k   1. Al-
though players in N(gk; Qk) would like to be in any N(gj ; Qj) with j = 1; :::; k   1, no
player in that components would like to change its position in N(gj ; Qj), j = 1; :::; k   1,
with the position of any player in N(gk; Qk).
Let
(h;Q)[S] = argmax
hgS ;QP s.t.
(h;Q) is connected
v(h;Q) P
S02Q

#S0
2 +mod[#S
0; 2]
! .
be the connected sub-coalitional network out of those that can be formed by players in
S  N with the highest per capita value for a majority of players in each S0, S0 2 Q. Given
a component additive partition value function v, a similar algorithm as before provides us
a coalitional network (g; P )v;cm.
10Jackson (2005) has proposed a similar algorithm for nding a network that is pairwise stable and
Pareto e¢ cient under the classic component-wise egalitarian rule.
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Proposition 7 Under a component additive partition value function v, a coalitional net-
work (g; P )v;cm dened by the preceding algorithm is contractually stable under the simple
majority decision rule and the component-wise majoritarian allocation rule Y cm.
Proof. Given the algorithm and the component-wise majoritarian allocation rule Y cm, a
majority of players in each coalition S0, S0 2 Q1, in the component (g1; Q1) 2 (h;Q)[N ]
obtain the highest possible payo¤ they can get. So, any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cm
via some coalition S containing some members of N(g1; Q1) would be blocked by the ma-
jority of players in each coalition S0, S0 2 Q1. Moreover, a majority of players in each
coalition S0, S0 2 Qk, in the component (gk; Qk) 2 (h;Q)[N n [ik 1N(gi; Qi)] obtain the
highest possible payo¤ they can get among the players in N n [ik 1N(gi; Qi). So, any
(g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cm via some coalition S  N n [ik 1N(gi; Qi) containing
some members of N(gk; Qk) would be blocked by the majority of players in each coalition
S0, S0 2 Qk. However, the majority of players in each S0, S0 2 Qk, in the component
(gk; Qk) receive a smaller payo¤ than a majority of players in each S0, S0 2 Qj , in each
component (gj ; Qj), for j = 1; :::; k  1. But any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cm via S,
involving some players in some (gj ; Qj), j = 1; :::; k   1, would be blocked by a majority
of players in each coalition S0, S0 2 Qj .
Let
(h;Q)[S] = argmax
hgS ;QP
s.t. (h;Q) is connected
v(h;Q)
#Q
.
be the connected sub-coalitional network out of those that can be formed by players in
S  N with the highest per capita value for a single player in each S0, S0  Q. Given a
component additive partition value function v, a similar algorithm as before provides us
a coalitional network (g; P )v;cd.
Proposition 8 Under a component additive partition value function v, a coalitional net-
work (g; P )v;cd dened by the preceding algorithm is contractually stable under the una-
nimity decision rule and the component-wise dictatorial allocation rule Y cd.
Proof. Given the algorithm and the component-wise dictatorial allocation rule Y cd, a
single player in each coalition S0, S0 2 Q1, in the component (g1; Q1) 2 (h;Q)[N ] obtain
the highest possible payo¤ he can get. So, any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cm via some
coalition S containing some members of N(g1; Q1) would be blocked by the player that
obtains the highest possible payo¤ in each coalition S0, S0 2 Q1. Moreover, a single player
in each coalition S0, S0 2 Qk, in the component (gk; Qk) 2 (h;Q)[N n [ik 1N(gi; Qi)]
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obtain the highest possible payo¤ he can get among the players in N n [ik 1N(gi; Qi)).
So, any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cd via some coalition S  N n[ik 1N(gi; Qi) con-
taining some members of N(gk; Qk) would be blocked by the player obtaining the highest
payo¤ in each coalition S0, S0 2 Qk. Finally, any (g0; P 0) obtainable from (g; P )v;cd via S,
involving some players in some (gj ; Qj), j = 1; :::; k   1, would be blocked by the player
receiving the highest payo¤ in each coalition S0, S0 2 Qj .
Let us now reconsider the connections model with communication costs shared within
groups. We have already shown that, for any parameter values, there is always an e¢ cient
coalitional network which is contractually stable in case of three players under the simple
majority decision rule. But what happens for N > 3? We have that, for  < c < +N 22 
2,
the e¢ cient coalitional networks consist of a star network associated to any coalition
structure. A coalitional network consisting of a star network associated to a coalition
structure where (i) the central player is a singleton (he is alone in a coalition) is never
contractually stable under the simple majority decision rule because this central player
has incentives to cut links, (ii) the central player belongs to a coalition consisting of at
least three players is never contractually stable under the simple majority rule because the
partners of the central player have incentives to break the coalition to become singletons.
The last case to be considered is the star network associated to a coalition structure where
the central player forms a coalition with a single partner. If +N 2N  < c < +
N 2
2 
2 then
both the central player and his partner have incentives to cut all their links. However, if
 < c < minf+ N 2N ; + N 22 2g, then the central players partner does not want to cut
the link he has with the central player. We conclude that: (i) for +N 2N  < c < +
N 2
2 
2,
no e¢ cient coalitional network is contractually stable under the simple majority decision
rule; (ii) for  < c < minf + N 2N ;  + N 22 2g, the coalitional network consisting of the
star network associated to a coalition structure where the central player forms a coalition
with a single partner is e¢ cient and contractually stable under the simple majority decision
rule. Thus, requiring the consent of group members may not be su¢ cient to stabilize the
e¢ cient coalitional networks. A solution to overcome the conict between stability and
e¢ ciency in this example is to impose either the unanimity decision rule or a specic
allocation rule.
5 Discussion
Before concluding we comment upon some of the features of the model. First, the model
is general enough to study the emergence of "community structures" where links between
individuals belonging to di¤erent communities are infeasible. Second, we enrich the model
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so that overlapping collections of individuals may arise.
5.1 Community structures
Many real world social and economic networks are composed of many communities of
nodes, where the nodes of the same community are highly connected, while there are few
links between the nodes of di¤erent communities.11 Suppose that two players can be linked
to each other only if they belong to the same coalition. Then, the set of feasible coalitional
networks becomes
f(g; P ) 2 GN  P : ij 2 g only if S(i) = S(j)g.
This situation may be interpreted as a limit case of community structures.
Proposition 9 Suppose that two players can be linked to each other only if they belong to
the same coalition. Then, under a component additive partition value function v, e¢ cient
coalitional networks are always contractually stable under the unanimity decision rule.
If there are no externalities among coalitions (which coincide with components since
players cannot be linked to players belonging to other coalitions), then it is possible to
stabilize the e¢ cient coalitional networks thanks to the unanimity decision rule, and this,
whatever the allocation rule. However, once only the consent of more than half members
of the initial coalitions of the deviating players is required, then we need to impose a
specic allocation rule to stabilize the e¢ cient coalitional networks.
Proposition 10 Suppose that two players can be linked to each other only if they belong
to the same coalition. Under a component additive partition value function v, e¢ cient
community structures are contractually stable under the majority decision rule and the
component-wise majoritarian allocation rule.
Proof. Let f(g; P ) 2 GN  P : ij 2 g only if S(i) = S(j)g be the set of feasible
coalitional networks. Then, for any component additive partition value function v, the
component-wise majoritarian allocation rule Y cm is such that for any (h; S) 2 C(g; P ),
Y cmi (g; P; v) = v(h; S)[
#S
2 +mod[#S; 2]]
 1 8i 2 S0  S and Y cmi (g; P; v) = 0 8i 2 S00  S,
with S0 \ S00 = ?, S0 [ S00 = S, #S0  #S00  #S2   mod[#S; 2], and iS
00
> j 8j 2 S0.
Let (g; P ) be an e¢ cient coalitional network with P = fS1 ; S2 ; :::; Smg. First, any devi-
ation from (g; P ) to any (g0; P ) by a coalition S  Sj will be blocked because (g; P ) is
e¢ cient and hence in (g0; P ) players in S0  Sj are worse o¤ than in (g; P ) and players
11See for instance Jackson (2008) or Wasserman and Faust (1994). Research on community structures
mainly deals with the detection of these communities in network data.
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in S00  Sj are equal o¤. Second, any deviation from (g; P ) to any (g0; P 0) by a coalition
S = S1 [ S2 [ ::: with P 0 = P n fS1 ; S2 ; :::g [ fS1 [ S2 [ :::g will be blocked by all the
deviating players in S1 [ S2 [ ::: that obtain a payo¤ of zero. Third, any deviation from
(g; P ) to any (g0; P 0) by a coalition S  Sj with P 0 = P n fSj g [ fS0j [ S00j [ :::g and
Sj = S
0
j [S00j [ ::: will be blocked by all the deviating players that obtain a payo¤ of zero in
every S0j ; S
00
j ; :::, with S

j = S
0
j [ S00j [ ::: Fourth, any deviation from (g; P ) to any (g0; P 0)
by a coalition S with P 0 = P n fS1 ; S2g [ fSg [ fS1 n (S1 \ S)g [ fS2 n (S2 \ S)g will be
blocked by all the deviating players that obtain a payo¤ of zero in (g0; P 0).
5.2 Overlapping coalitions
There are many situations in which players may belong simultaneously to more than one
coalition.12 Overlapping groups of individuals may be involved in relationships involv-
ing reciprocity, information-sharing, working half-time in two rms, club memberships or
public goods provision. A cover of N , N = f1; :::; ng being the set players, is a collection
of coalitions  = fS1; :::; Smg such that [ma=1Sa = N (a coalition structure is a special
case of a cover). An overlapping coalitional network (g; ) consists of a network g and
a cover . Let (j) = fS 2  : j 2 Sg be the set of coalitions in the cover  to which
player j belongs. Let  = fS  N : #S = 2g be the the cover where each pair of play-
ers forms a coalition. We denote by   the set of all possible covers.13 A cover value
function is a function v : GN    ! R which assigns a value v(g; ) to each overlapping
coalitional network (g; ). An allocation rule is a function Y : GN     V ! RN such
that
P
i2N Yi(g; ; v) = v(g; ) for all v, g and  which tells us how the value v(g; ) is
distributed among the players.
An overlapping coalitional network (g0; 0) is obtainable from (g; ) via S, S  N , if
(i) ij 2 g0 and ij =2 g implies fi; jg  S, (ii) ij =2 g0 and ij 2 g implies fi; jg \ S 6= ?, (iii)
fSa n (Sa \ S) : Sa 2 ; Sa =2 0g = fS0a 2 0 : S0a  N n Sg, and (iv) 9fS01; S02; :::; S0mg 
0 such that [ma=1S0a = S. An overlapping coalitional network (g; ) is contractually
stable under the simple majority decision rule with respect to cover value function v and
12The possiblity of belonging to more than one coalition means that contracts (or coalitions) are nonex-
clusive.
13The notion of conference structure is any collection of conferences. The term conference refers to any
set of two or more players who might meet together to discuss their cooperative plans. Thus, a conference
structure is simply a cover  such that for any S 2  we have jSj  2. The set of all possible conference
structures is f : 8S 2 ; S  N and jSj  2g which is a strict subset of  . Myerson (1980) has studied
allocations rules, which are functions mapping conference structures to payo¤ allocations, to describe how
the outcome of a cooperative game might depend on which groups of players hold cooperative planning
conferences.
21
allocation rule Y if for any S  N , (g0; 0) obtainable from (g; ) via S and i 2 S such that
Yi(g
0; 0; v) > Yi(g; ; v), there exists: (i) l 2 S such that Yl(g0; 0; v)  Yl(g; ; v), or (ii)bS  bS(j) with bS(j) 2 (j) and j 2 S such that Yk(g0; 0; v)  Yk(g; ; v) for all k 2 bS and
#bS  12#bS(j). Under the simple majority decision rule, the move from an overlapping
coalitional network (g; ) to any obtainable overlapping coalitional network (g0; 0) needs
the consent of every deviating player as well as the consent of a majority of members of
each coalition of the deviating players in .
Proposition 11 Suppose that v(g; ) = v(g) 8 2  . Under the simple majority decision
rule, there always exists a contractually stable overlapping coalitional network.
Proof. Take the e¢ cient network g. Then, (g; ) is contractually stable under the
simple majority rule whatever the allocation rule. Indeed, for all (g0; ) obtainable from
(g; ) via S there is a player i 2 N such that Yi(g0; ; v) < Yi(g; ; v) and 9S0 2  such
that i 2 S0 and S0 \ S 6= ?.
In many situations, the cover  (where each pair of players makes a binding contract)
is not necessary to sustain the e¢ cient network and a smaller number of binding contracts
may be su¢ cient to stabilize the e¢ cient network. It should be noted that, once forming
coalitions (or making binding contracts) is costly, a conict between stability and e¢ ciency
may again occur.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links
and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We have introduced the notion
of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network
species the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members
and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are
going to emerge at equilibrium we have used the concept of contractual stability which
requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the
deviating players and their original coalition partners. We have shown that there always
exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule
and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. However, once we
adopt the component-wise dictatorial allocation rule, a contractually stable coalitional
network always exists only under the unanimity decision rule. Looking at some classical
examples, we have shown that requiring the consent of group members under the simple
majority may help to reconcile stability and e¢ ciency.
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